Since
2003, Europe 2020 has considered
as highly probable
the appearance of a European crisis
resulting from the failure of the
Constitution’s ratification
process. For this reason, Europe
2020 has been thinking for a long
time already about possible alternatives
to the Constitution. This reflection
took shape along the various internal
discussions, interviews with EU
political and administrative officials,
and debates with the European civil
society; and also included elements
drawn from the public debates that
developed around the ratification
processes.
This
first anticipation paper of the
series « Possible
alternatives after the ratification’s
failure » will be concerned
with the now inevitable process
of differentiation between the
Euro zone (Euroland) and the European
Union, in the short and medium
term, as concerns the B plan that
must be designed to prevent the
entire European process to enter
a major crisis in terms of democratic
legitimacy and of operational coherence
that could be fatal.
The Euro introduced logics that
are specific to the countries of
the Euro zone, characterised by
a significant increase of citizen
awareness of the importance of
European issues. This increase
did not take place, or only marginally,
in the countries outside the Euro
zone. Moreover this increased awareness
has mostly taken a negative form
except among two categories: the
seniors who see in the Euro the
completion of 50 years of peace-effort,
and the wealthy classes who find
in the Euro a facilitator to their
trans-European activities (professional
and recreational). For this
reason, in its October 2004 strategic
note to the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Europe 2020
warned against a « Yes » communication
based on a merely positive vision
of the EU, likely to be ineffective
especially on the 25/45 age category.
A very strong differentiation
between citizen expectations
in the Euro zone and in the rest
of the EU
Regarding this part of the population
of the Euro zone - which can be
extended to the 18/50 age categories
if we consider referenda statistics
- they present other specificities
when compared to the same age category
in the rest of the EU: most of
the Euro zone countries entered
the EU at least one generation
ago, in fact two generations ago
in the case of the 6 founding member
states; the 18/50 years-old
age category in the Euro zone is
therefore made up of the first
two generations “born in
Europe”. Outside the
Euro zone, most member states either
joined the European process only
very recently or never fully accepted
being part of it (UK and Denmark).
Seen from this angle, it is quite
normal that the level of Euro-citizen
maturity is very different from
one zone to the other. This paper
does not intend to enter the detail
of the difference between the two
groups mentioned. It is enough
for now to acknowledge that expectations
in the Euro zone have something
to do with a longing for some democratic
control of the EU process due to
the influence Europe has taken
in people’s lives, people
who otherwise together feel “naturally” European.
These characteristics are to oppose
to the extremely diversified expectations
outside the Euro zone ranging from
a desire to keep some distance
with the level of European integration
induced by the Euro zone, to the
will of joining this level of integration
without having the capacity yet
to do it, nor a precise idea of
the political implications.
In
other words politically speaking,
on the one hand we have a rather
homogeneous population, « naturally » European
and bearer of a democratic demand
in relation to the European project;
while on the other hand, we have
some rather heterogeneous populations
as regards their expectations and
their knowledge/experience of the
European project.
Combined with this political differentiation,
there is also of course a social
and economical differentiation.
The requirements entailed by the
Euro in the economic and social
fields are now obvious for the
inhabitants of Euroland. Apart
from a demand for greater democratic
control on the European process,
these populations are looking forward
to see the implementation of the
economic, fiscal, social measures
required to compensate the side
effects induced by a simply monetary
governance of the zone as it is
the case today. Of course
populations outside the Euro zone
are not submitted to such effects
and have no such expectations.
Moreover, a new parameter is to
be taken into consideration: the
enlargement has significantly increased
the number of non-Euro countries
in the EU (13 instead of 3 before
2004), therefore people inside
the Euro zone find it more and
more difficult to understand that
EU mechanisms and institutions
continue to play a significant
role in the management of Euroland.
The failure of the Constitution
was partly written in this differentiation
which resulted from two quasi-simultaneous
events: the Euro-related increased
level of integration, and the
enlargement-related extension
of pre-Euro EU. In order
to avoid a new series of misfortunes
which in this case could be really
dangerous for the European project
(the Constitution’s failure
won’t if lessons are taught
rapidly), Europe 2020 advises
the European Council to preside
over a double process.
Euro Zone:
Towards a European Political
Community (EPC)
As
regards the Euro zone, it
has become essential
and urgent to build the instruments
of political and economic governance
vis-à-vis the Central
Bank. In order to
respond to the democratic expectations,
these instruments cannot be
simply executive; they will
have to include a legislative
component.In order to
comply with the requirements
of growth and competition of
the Euro zone, decisions in
the matter must be made by
the beginning of 2006, thus
cutting short feelings that
there would be a “durable
crisis” of the European
project.In
order to be credible and entail
public support1 ,
these new institutions should
be located outside the EU institutional
triangle (Brussels-Strasbourg-Luxembourg),
following the example of the
ECB’s strategic location
in Frankfurt.
The
re-launch
of the European
project via
the Euro
zone is not
one option
along other,
it is a necessity;
it won’t
work if it
is limited
to few institutional
patches (such
as the recent
minor developments
at Ecofin
and Eurogroup
these months)
but requires
an extensive
and innovating
action-plan. A « European
Political
Community » Treaty
establishing
the economic,
social and
democratic
dimensions
expected
by Euro zone
citizens,
could be
a means,
if it were
drafted by
the sole
Euro zone
member states
and submitted
to one referendum
held on the
same day
all over
the 12 countries.
As regards
the EU: Launch of trans-European
political parties
For the EU, there is no real alternative or B Plan to be expected from the
institutions. In fact, the EU as such can only patch up
the Treaty of Nice with some elements drawn from the Constitution (Presidency,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, vote-weight). The heterogeneity of the zone,
economically and socially as well as in terms of political expectations,
prevents any new initiative to be launched on the scale of the entire
EU, given the failure of the constitutional project. The two future-bearer
paths relate on the one hand to socio-economic developments that should
bring an increasing number of countries to consider joining the Euro
zone (under its new ECP form) by 2010/14, progressively building convergence
between the two zone ; and on the other hand to the emergence of trans-European
political parties presenting lists in the 2009 and 2014 2 elections,
to accelerate the convergence of European public opinion and the democratisation
of the EU (main political challenge of the zone as shown by the current
crisis initiated in two founding countries « with a referendum »).
Those
conclusions may seem audacious
and ambitious. Let’s keep
in mind that the current crisis
is a historic one and therefore
requires from the Europeans as
much boldness and ambition as show
by the post-War generation of the
Founding-Fathers.
Europe 2020 would like to remind that there are only nine months between the
failure of EDC in 1954 and the Messine Conference which cast the bases of the
European Economic Community launched two years after.
What is required to succeed in this new project, is that our European leaders
define together an ambitious project capable of gathering together a large
majority of the population which was divided over the Constitution by lack
of vision and democratisation (Yes voters and half of No voters are in fact
in favour of “more Europe”). Europe 2020 thinks it is inside the
Euro zone only that the conditions are gathered for a political jump to take
place as an answer to the central demand for democratisation expressed by the
citizens.
Paris
Franck Biancheri
1. We remind that
along both French and Dutch referenda,
the European Commission appeared
clearly as the institution most
strongly rejected by the public
opinion ; meanwhile the European
Parliament is seen as a politically
neglectable quantity (if we compare
participation to the European
elections and to the referenda
just a year after, the conclusion
is clear). Though a regrettable
fact, Brussels and Strasbourg
now convey negative feelings
unlikely to serve as a basis
to mobilise citizens around a
European project. A future Paper
of the present series shall detail
this issue.
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2. Europe 2020
will bring entire support, both
intellectual and operational,
to all the initiatives heading
towards the creation of trans-European
political parties. This support
will be granted under the strict
condition that those parties
are trans-European from the start;
indeed Europe 2020 believes it
is impossible to create such
parties by federating national
parties such as those which have
occupied the European Parliament
in the last decades.
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