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The future of Transatlantic Relations
is not anymore what it used to be? Open
letter to future US elites in charge of
Transatlantic Relations
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by
Franck Biancheri:
President of TIESWeb and Director for Studies and Strategy
of Europe 2020.
28/06/2004 |
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Most probably,
by next November, a new administration
will be elected in the US. There is
no wishful thinking about it (though
90% of Europeans do expect that G.W.
Bush will loose). But changing to Kerry’s
administration will not by itself makes
EU/US relations successful. Of course
the new administration will be able
and willing to listen and start a true
discussion over all major issues on
the Transatlantic agenda. Europeans
will therefore be very willing to prove
that they genuinely were against the
Bush administration’s positions
and not at all against the USA.
Most
probably, by next November, a new administration
will be elected in the US. There is
no wishful thinking about it (though
90% of Europeans do expect that G.W.
Bush will loose). But changing to Kerry’s
administration will not by itself makes
EU/US relations successful. Of course
the new administration will be able
and willing to listen and start a true
discussion over all major issues on
the Transatlantic agenda. Europeans
will therefore be very willing to prove
that they genuinely were against the
Bush administration’s positions
and not at all against the USA.
But as was telling me a good US friend
of mine in the recent Transatlantic
seminar ‘Reconstructing the West’,
organised in Berlin by the German Peace
and Development Foundation, the American
Council on Germany and the American
Institute for Contemporary German Studies:
‘The Democrats are so ‘in
love’ with Europe that they do
believe that they own a share of it;
and that they will feel entitled to
keep on telling the Europeans what they
should do. In two years time the honeymoon
will develop into bitter conflicts’.
He maybe pretty right especially if
the Europeans do not explain clearly,
from scratch, to their US counterparts
that Europe and the EU has changed a
lot during the past 5 years; and that
the European perspective on Transatlantic
relations will never be the same after
the Iraq crisis. Bush’s presidency
has indeed emancipate Europe’s
public opinions from the Transatlantic
relations born in the wake of WWII.
He did not do it all by himself; but
he did act as a catalyst for trends
generated by the end of the Cold War
and the success of European integration.
The catalytic reaction took place and
it is not a reversible one. We must
now invent a new course for the Transatlantic
relation which is already bi-polar (EU/US)
and not anymore multilateral (US and
each EU country).
But
let’s go step by step through
each of these two assertions: a ‘regime
change’ will take place next November;
and Democrats too must change their
vision of Transatlantic relations.
First,
about next US presidential elections.
Closely monitoring US society for about
a decade, and being actively involved
in developing the TIESWEB network all
around the country for 6 years, I am
now convinced that the five main trends
currently at work within the US electorate
will indeed generate a ‘regime
change’ in Washington. Those five
trends are:
. the growing understanding by US
citizens of the gigantic failure generated
by the US invasion of Iraq (and the
progressive emerging of facts, decisions,
manipulations, lies which have been
used to make it happen) which is generating
a growing unease even within the Republican
Party constituency
. the lack of positive perspective
on short term in Iraq which will keep
on nurturing the news with ‘bad
news’, whatever amount of money
will be invested by the huge propaganda
machine of the Bush campaign
. the lack of micro-economic impact
of the supposed to be economic recovery
(US workers are still waiting to see
new jobs created)
. the new interest for politics of
young people, minorities and citizens,
who used to be convinced that there
vote did not matter, generated by
the ‘strange’ scenario
of the last presidential elections
(still alive in memories of many who
did not go to vote at that time) and
by the very strong opposition generated
by current administration’s
policies on international relations,
environment, social issues and of
course Iraq
. the emerging in past months of anti-Bush
feelings within Republican ranks as
expressed by former public servants
(as recently did senior diplomats
and top-ranking militaries), business
leaders or even public figures (last
example is Ronald Reagan’s son).
To win a presidential election you need
to gather 100% of your own political
family and attract parts of those who
could vote for the other side. When
you cannot mobilize 100% of your own
party basis and when on the contrary
your opponent can count on such a process,
then, you are terminated.
This evolution will start to be accurately
reflected by surveys in about two weeks
when US people will understand that
the so-called ‘handover’
to Iraqis is just another attempt to
hide the on-going failure in Iraq, as
is the conviction that things will go
better for US troops after this deadline.
The conviction that things will go better
after June 30th is the last element
which still prevents a significant number
of voters to flip side. They do believe
what the president has been repeatedly
saying that June 30th will mark a change
in the situation. As soon as they see
that it will not be (by mid-July), then,
they will immediately turn away from
G.W. Bush.
Now,
let’s have a look to the other
assertion that the future Democrat administration
must develop a completely new vision
of EU/US relations.
First, it is true indeed that the Transatlanticist
Democrats tend to love so much Europe
that they have big difficulty understanding
that Europeans have ideas of their own
regarding what their future should be.
Let’s take a very simple and up-to-date
example: Turkey’s attempt to join
the EU. What G.W. Bush has been repeating
during his stay in Turkey is very significant
of what will not work anymore in EU/US
relations: ‘Turkey must join the
EU. The EU must say ‘Yes’
to Turkey’s bid next December’.
Without even considering the position
he promotes, one thing naturally comes
to mind to European citizens today:
‘Bush’s better take care
of his own country. How comes that he
expresses his opinion about something
which is of sole responsibility of Europeans
themselves?’. For decades, US’
involvement within internal EU affairs
was taken for granted by US elites and
by Europeans. Today, and especially
after the Iraq crisis, only a handful
of officials and experts (the ‘usual
suspects’ you meet in all Transatlantic
seminars for the past 3 decades)still
think the same,while an overwhelming
majority of Europeans do not feel that
normal anymore.
The Turkish issue is very significant
as it is an highly volatile and divisive
question within the EU. The ‘pro-Turkey’
finds extremely embarrassing the US
public support as it fuels the old suspicion
that the entry of Turkey within the
EU is serving US interests and not European
ones (again a clear difference of perception
ignored by public opinion just a decade
ago); and the ‘anti-Turkey’
use this ‘support’ to show
that indeed it is not in European interest
because the US wants it. Meanwhile,
while there is absolutely no objective
reasons to have such a link but just
US insistence to have a public word
on that issue, it is generating even
worst feelings towards the US as trying
to influence EU’s own future.
When speaking to a US audience, I use
to give a good analogy of the impact
on European public opinion today of
such declarations: it is as if the European
Union would tell the USA that they should
accelerate NAFTA integration and have
Mexico joining the US in the very next
years and denying the right for the
USA to do otherwise but for racism.
I let you imagine what would be US public
opinion reactions to such kind of European
declarations. Today’s Europeans
do feel the same way when G.W. Bush,
or any future US president, will make
such kind of declaration about the EU
and Turkey.
This example shows the kind of challenge
facing future EU/US relations which
indeed are becoming bipolar and not
anymore multilateral, as convincingly
explained John van Oudenaren, Head of
the European Division of the Library
of Congress, at this seminar a week
ago in Berlin. Two big political entities
of different age (the EU is much younger
than the USA) and different nature (the
USA is inspired by the classical ‘nation-state’
identity while the EU is building up
a sui-generis identity) have to learn
how to interact in a world where together
they do matter a lot, but in a world
too which is made of other powers. Simply
said, the only thing which is essentially
still the same compared to 1945 is the
US itself; everything else is different.
If the challenge is for each side of
the Ocean, the initial task may be more
difficult for the US as it is more complex
to understand that things are changed
when oneself has not changed that much
compared to its own environment.
Such
an adaptation of future US elites in
charge of Transatlantic relations will
require from them a tremendous ability
to put in question the very basis of
their own belief and convictions about
what Transatlantic relations have been
for decades. They will need a great
curiosity to try to understand what
is becoming this New European Union
emerging from the fall of the Iron Curtain
and the Iraq Transatlantic Crisis. Similarly
Europeans should be willing to explain
the evolution even when they are difficult
to explain, especially when they are
difficult to explain. Europeans must
be pro-active in doing so, as for instance
will do Europe 2020 with its first seminar
of the second GlobalEurope 2020 series
which will take place next Spring in
Washington, in order to discuss with
US elites the vision developed among
Europeans last January in the Hague
about future EU/US relations.
Meanwhile,
the change of patterns is also a change
of players. This trend goes of course
beyond EU/US relations and is affecting
the whole sphere of international relations.
As we were saying when we set up TIESWEB
in 1997/1998: ‘in coming years
civil societies will become a major
player of Transatlantic relations which
will require new tools and new methods
if we want this new player to constructively
act in terms of EU/US relations’.
Assessing and impacting on future Transatlantic
relations require to enlarge the circle
of people involved in EU/US cooperation
to a group going far beyond the handful
of ‘usual suspects’ haunting
Transatlantic conferences or monopolizing
the ‘opinion making’ of
this issue.
US
society is a mine of energy and enthusiasm
for such a new Transatlantic endeavour;
European society is willing and ready
to bring its new combined assets into
the game. The elites have now to show
that they are up to the challenge; and
especially the US elites who, let’s
be honest, till now where having a complete
control of the game. Meanwhile both
sides have to also go to the terrain
and directly discuss with civil society
players, with community leaders in order
to ‘get the message’ to
the people. For that reason, I have
decided to dedicate a full month of
my life next Spring to launch the ‘TIESWEB
Transatlantic Marathon’ This series
of 15 conferences in 30 days in 15 different
US States (in big and small towns) will
be co-organized with think-tanks, ngos,
universities and local communities in
the same way I did the Newropeans Democracy
Marathon last year. I hope to pave the
way for many other ‘Transatlantic
Marathonians’ in coming years.
If
US intellectual curiosity and EU will
to explain can meet, then we may bet
on the best for future Transatlantic
relations. If on the contrary, US intellectual
complacency and EU weakness of character
prevails, then we are heading for major
Transatlantic confrontations.
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