In the last days, we have seen a huge propaganda machine at work aimed at convincing European and American people that NATO would soon do something in Iraq and that its coming Summit in Istanbul was to be the time and place for the decision to be taken.

We are reading that Washington does not expect much in terms of involvement of NATO in Iraq (only training security forces), but we understand that the Bush campaign is eager to be capable of saying that international support to its invasion of Iraq is broadening (after a year of continuous shrinking).

We have been noticing for weeks now the General Secretary of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, delivering a kind of morally pressuring speech conveying the idea that if the Iraqi government did ask NATOS’ help, then of course it would be morally unacceptable for NATO to refuse (when you know that current Iraqi government is a mere US puppet, you wonder what morality has to do with all that; sometimes the Dutch moral finger is definitely not pointing in the good direction!).

And then, surprise, surprise! Guess what: the present ‘independent’ Iraqi Prime Minister does call for NATO support. Unbelievable how life is full of coincidence, isn’it ? Of course it helps a bit when the three players are de facto expressing the same will, the will of G.W. Bush’s administration.

Now let’s get to serious work and away from this Iraq/Nato poor joke. Why?
Well, mainly because with the Iraq crisis, it is the very future of the Alliance which is at stake.

Let’s have six points straight :

1. Whatever comes out of the Istanbul Summit in terms of diplomatic jargon, the fact is that NATO will not do anything in Iraq, and nothing significant for Iraq at this stage. If another story is told at the end, for instance by journalists such as John Vinocur or such professional propagandists, it will just be ‘cosmetics’ and the following weeks will indeed show that nothing happens.

2. The reasons of that are very simple: NATO is made up of countries that have already clearly expressed their position about Iraq. There is not a single reason in the world why they would change their opinion this weekend in Istanbul.

3. Political leaders are elected. And the unpopularity of this war is reaching even higher peaks than a year ago. Even in the USA, a majority of Americans now think that it was a major mistake (see USA today, 06/24/2004). Why would those leaders play against their convictions and their political interest?

4. Bush has not been able to come up with any serious proposal about Iraq’s future to get the international community on board, or the Iraqi people. The overwhelming majority of historical US allies (including those currently in Iraq) is appalled by the lack of professionalism and pragmatism with which all decisions regarding Iraq are made. Therefore Iraq is a complete mess with no real power in control. Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz may try to pretend the contrary, the ‘transition government’ is even weaker as was Thieu’s government in Vietnam during the war in this country. Who seriously would have liked to see the Alliance moving into Vietnam at the end of the 60s? Basically the situation is about the same today in Iraq.

5. All Allies have experienced the impossibility to have any discussion with Bush’s administration. As a US think-tank expert was recently saying in a Transatlantic seminar: ‘This administration knows how to emit, but to not how to receive. They are built like TV, not like a telephone or Internet. Only broadcasting, never listening.’ Such a situation explains why there are fewer countries involved in Iraq today than a year ago. Of course those who are there and cannot pull out (like Poland for instance where there has been no democratically legitimate government for months and which is run in this matter through almost direct Washington influence) would like to see the others come in order to share the ‘mess’ burden’, and try to decrease the pressure of their own public opinion. But that’s not the way history works.

6. And last but not least, why bother helping G.W. Bush presidential reelection campaign (by giving him a boost with some NATO support) when you do think that he is a bad president doing a bad policy, and when you can see from current US domestic political trends that he is likely to loose on next November? The answer is simple: you don’t bother to do that and you just apply the old British proverb (obviously forgotten by UK’s government): ‘Wait and see until November!’.

Now what about NATO’s future? What’s the linkage ?

The link between NATO’s possible involvement in Iraq and its survival is indeed direct. First, NATO does not have the resources to conduct all its current operations from former Yougoslavia to Afghanistan. If it decides to act for Iraq it will be overstretched and appear a far less impressive force than it used to be; like the US army in Iraq. NATO should never forget that its credibility comes from the impression that it can mobilize huge power. Better keep the impression than showing the contrary! Otherwise even in former Communist countries, support to NATO will plummet because Eastern Europeans like NATO for its alleged strength, not for its rethorics.

Second, since the end of the Soviet threat, NATO has lost its main rationale for European populations (not yet among the new EU Member-States, but definitely within EU-15). Therefore the very ‘un-democratic’ processes at the core of the Alliance’s decision making process (total lack of public consultation – populations or parliaments - prior to getting involved into a war) are being increasingly questioned within Europe. An involvement in Iraq will be the catalyst which will generate a flurry of protests against and opposition to the very system under which the Alliance is functioning. It would be a fatal blow for NATO at a time when it has not yet found a new ‘grand design’ for its future.

The Bush administration has already ruined US credibility worldwide. I wonder whether NATO wants this administration to also ruin its own future.