|
|
|
Forget about healing transatlantic wounds; now it's about building a new partnership
|
by
Franck Biancheri:
President of TIESWeb and Director for Studies and Strategy
of Europe 2020.
15/04/2003 |
|
Current
Iraq/UN crisis between Europeans and
Americans have clashed with deeply rooted
European trends and will generate long
term consequences
Whatever
some would like to believe on both
sides of the Atlantic, the consequences
of the Iraq/UN crisis will have long,
sustainable consequences. What they
embody is the end of the post WWII
order which first big crack was the
fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989.
In many ways, current Iraq/UN crisis
will generate effects of the same
magnitude: the US led 'West Side Story'.
Of
course at first sight, everything
looks completely different, if not
opposed: on the one hand, we had a
crumbling Empire, defeated by its
inability to move forward and adapt
itself to this finishing XXth century
socio-economic conditions; on the
other hand, we have what is commonly
described as the only, or the last,
'super-power', seemingly at the perigee
of its might. How comes that these
two events could be in any way the
two faces of the same coin?
Empires
are XXIst century political dinosaurs
Well,
simply because of something called
History, passing time, transitory
nature of human glory (Sic Transit
Gloria Mundi),
all these things
which powers of all sorts in History
have learnt to learn
by force
Because nothing lasts forever
Because there is no such thing as
the end of History
Because one
of the most fragile political structures
on Earth is
the Empire. About
this last point, it is extremely interesting
to look at the duration of empires
in the past 2 centuries: obviously
their life expectancy is not anymore
going beyond a century, if not just
a few decades. Europe was the first
place where empires learnt that their
time had passed. Europe was first
hit by this fact in the XXth century
and empires as well as dreams of eternal
might had to vanish (though they did
it at a very heavy cost in terms of
death and destruction). Most likely
this fact will also affect the rest
of the world in the coming decades.
Let's hope destruction and death will
be more limited than in European history
Many
reasons to the progressive disappearing
of those political dinosaurs called
'Empires', of course. One may be the
simple fact that we now live in a
full world: full of people, full of
information, full of common problems
and challenges. Those huge machineries
that empires are (bureaucratic machineries
combined with a political power always
closely connected to religion and
God) seem to have become unable to
deal with the growing complexity of
modern societies (inside and with
the rest of the world). Their own
management progressively becomes a
fight in itself, a fight for who will
control the empire. A 'power bubble'
where the rest of the world and all
other issues are only seen in terms
of 'rapport de forces' within this
'bubble'. Such 'power bubbles' do
emerge regularly in centralistic systems
where power is concentrated in a precise
city/region, like in Washington today.
The
Europeans are facing challenges far
more important to them and the rest
of the world, than preservingUS power
on top
But
how does that affect transatlantic
relations? Well in two very simple
ways:
-
Though they agree to the importance
of transatlantic relations, a growing
number of Europeans, in particular
among upcoming generations, do not
share the assumption that the US will
be anymore in the future able to lead
by itself the so-called 'West', in
particular its EU/US component, because
they see it as a declining empire
trying to rely on might to keep afloat
of its own problems.
-
The Europeans in many ways have fought
successfully in the past decade against
the threat of the emerging of such
a 'power bubble' at the core of the
European construction process. In
many ways, Brussels was tempted to
take such a path in the early 90s,
after the Fall of the Berlin Wall
and the successful implementation
of the Single Market. I remember top
Commission officials at that time
telling me: 'We are now the principal
force shaping up Europe'. It also
reminds me telling them that with
a bit of candid analysis they would
see that they were a very isolated
bunch of people in need for long lasting
political support, i.e. rooted in
democratic forces (or police and military
forces, which they did not control).
We all know what happened to this
idea in the past decade. Today the
Europeans are starting to understand
that they are on the verge of a major
historical challenge, which implications
are going much further than the boundaries
of the European continent: they are
coping with the problems of shaping
up a 500 millions citizens, multicultural,
multilingual democracy. A challenge
nobody ever faced in European or Human
history before. A challenge which,
if successfully met, will definitely
complete the European peace process
started by the European Community
founders after WW II; but also a challenge
which could lead to major breakthrough
regarding global issues ranging from
other continental integrations processes
such as in Asia, Africa, Latin America,
and also to Global Governance
challenges which will be on top of
the agenda for all of us all along
XXIst century.
These
are the deep European trends that
current transatlantic struggles on
Iraq and UN issues have clashed with.
It explains why the consequences will
be long lasting. It simply puts now
in the open trends which were there
for about a decade or so and where
buried under assumptions coming from
1945.
The
US is a European dream as much as
European unity is an American dream:
but now a new context emerges
In
many ways, the US is a European dream
as much as European unity is an American
dream. The point today is that the
dominant American dream about America
is looking like a European nightmare;
while the European dream about Europe
is looking like an American competitor.
It defines the new context in which
transatlantic relations will have
to be pursued in the coming decades.
It says all the obstacles which are
going to be in the way of those who
do think, as I am, that if we fail
to build a new constructive transatlantic
partnership for the XXIst century
then, the world will be unable to
solve many of its problems.
But those who are serious about building
a long lasting EU/US partnership have
to be candid about the new situation
and its consequences. It is not about
healing the wounds created by this
crisis.
It is on the contrary by getting deeper
in what created this crisis. It is
not about being politically correct
and not calling problems by their
names. It is on the contrary by 'calling
a cat, a cat' as we say in French.
It is not by being afraid to 'shock'
the other side; but on the contrary
to say unpleasant things if we think
that they deserve being said. Of course
this has to be made with keeping in
mind the overall objective of rebuilding
a new transatlantic partnership.
Therefore there is absolutely no place
for names-calling, country-bashing,
hatred,
. There should be no
place for arguments which prevent
discussions to move forward by helping
those involved to understand better
the other's position; but there should
be all space made available for ideas,
opinions helping out to break the
'conviction bubble' in which many
players tend to dig themselves into.
This is definitely, by the way, the
course TIESWEB will follow in coming
years.
I will conclude on this very question
of 'conviction'. In the past months,
and until today every day on TV or
in newspapers, we can hear to comments
praising 'leaders' convictions' as
if it had a value in itself. Hitler
was convinced he was right. Petain
was convinced he was right. Franco
was convinced he was right. Chamberlain
was convinced he was right. Gengis
Khan and Attila were most certainly
convinced that they were right. And
so what?
One's conviction is not a proof of
one's being right: it is just saying
that one has no doubt. It may come
from absolute knowledge (a pretty
rare thing when you are not God);
or from a very human ability to ignore
information which may raise doubt.
In
any case, as a European, I would tend
to think that not to have doubts is
a very specific feature, which fits
better to a religious leader than
to a politician. Here maybe is an
entry to some more politically incorrect
discussions regarding future EU/US
relations.
|
|
|
|
|
Subscription
|
|
|
Special
Files |
|
|
Interviews
|
|
|
News
Headlines |
|
|
Quiz
|
| |
|
| |
|